ABSTRACT: This paper studies how economic integration affects transfer pricing, tax policy, and welfare when multinationals are taxed either according to formula apportionment (FA) or separate accounting (SA). It is shown that economic integration induces multinationals to lower their transfer prices under both tax systems, but that transfer prices become less tax sensitive under FA than under SA. A main result of the paper is that economic integration lowers tax rates in the Nash equilibrium under SA, but leads to higher taxes in the Nash equilibrium under FA. JEL Classification: F15, F23, H25, H87
Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed a growing trend towards economic integration where national borders have diminished in importance, and capital, …rms, and labor have become more mobile internationally. Hand in hand with the economic integration of independent economic systems -local, national, and otherwise -has been the immense growth of foreign direct investments (FDI) and thus the rising importance of multinationals (MNCs). At the end of 1997, the gross product (value added) of all multinational corporations including parent …rms stood at an estimated $8 trillion, comprising roughly a quarter of the world's gross domestic product. countries. 2 Transfer pricing in Europe is documented by Weichenrieder (1996) who shows that German …rms have shifted pro…ts to the manufacturing sector in Ireland, thereby taking advantage of the low Irish tax rate. 3 There are two competing systems of corporate taxation that aim at solving the two problems outlined above. Most OECD countries use Separate Accounting (SA)
as a foundation for their corporate tax system. Under this system accountants and tax authorities try to identify the exact receipts and expenditures attributable to 1 World Investment Report 2000, ch. 1, United Nations. 2 For a survey of this literature, see Hines (1999) . 3 For theoretical studies of transfer pricing behavior see e.g., Horst (1971) and Kant (1990 quantity. 6 The soft response from the rival is bene…cial to the MNC as a whole.
Hence, delegation can achieve higher pro…ts than would arise if all decisions were undertaken centrally. The implication is that the transfer price has a strategic value in addition to being an instrument for pro…t shifting. Furthermore, since it is the HQs of the MNC that conduct trade policy, the chosen transfer price is both credible
and not in violation with international trade agreements.
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A critical di¤erence between previous work and our paper is that we study how economic integration under tax competition a¤ects equilibrium tax rates, transfer prices and national welfare. We show that the transfer price is relatively tax elastic for a high degree of economic integration under a separate accounting regime, while the opposite is true under formula apportionment. As a consequence, the impact of economic integration on welfare and on the intensity of tax competition depends crucially on the choice of tax scheme. Under separate accounting the conventional wisdom that increased economic integration forces government to reduce tax rates is supported by our …ndings. However, this is not true under formula apportionment, where increased integration reduces the tax elasticity of the transfer prices and indeed allows governments to levy higher tax rates. Finally, we show that from a welfare point of view the preferred tax principle may hinge on the level of economic integration.
In the following we study a three-stage game under separate accounting and formula apportionment respectively. The game leads to endogenous determination of tax rates and transfer prices, and the action by each government is observable in subsequent stages. The structure of the game is as follows: At the …rst stage the two governments choose tax rates simultaneously. Then, at the second stage the headquarters of each MNC set the transfer price. Finally, at the third stage there is quantity competition between plants in each country. Solving the game backwards, we start at the third stage, which is independent of the tax system. We then proceed 6 The opposite result would be true under price competition (i.e., a high transfer price would be preferable -see Schjelderup and Sørgard 1997). 7 The strategic role of the transfer price has been observed in the car industry and the petroleum industry. In the car industry it is often the case that the HQs of the MNC determine the export price on cars, but delegate decisions about the …nal price of the car to its subsidiary.
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to analyze the second and third stages of the game in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes.
Quantity competition (third stage)
We consider two countries, A and B, which are identical in all respects. Each country is host to the headquarters of a multinational corporation (MNC), and the headquarters command two plants, one in each country. The plant located in i produces quantities x ii and x ij with zero unit costs (where the …rst subscript indicates where the headquarters are located). 8 Quantity x ii is sold in country i at a price p i , while quantity x ij is exported to the a¢liate in country j at a transfer price g i and resold
in country j at price p j : A positive g i implies that the transfer price is higher than the marginal cost of production, while a negative g i signi…es underinvoicing. Quantity is the strategic variable and pro…ts before tax for the home and foreign MNCs are the sum of revenues from the a¢liates,
where ¿ denotes trade costs and C(g i ) is concealment costs of transfer pricing. It is assumed that the good is specialized so that the true cost of exporting cannot be directly observed by tax authorities. Hence, g i becomes an additional choice variable for the multinational …rm, which is determined by the headquarters of each multinational. In line with most of the literature on transfer pricing we make the realistic assumption that it is costly to conceal deviations in the transfer price from the true costs of exporting. The concealment cost function has the following properties
This means that the concealment costs are a convex function of the di¤erence between the declared and the true price of the exported good. 9 8 It can be shown that allowing positive unit costs does not a¤ect results qualitatively. 9 This assumption can be interpreted either as an increased probability of detection by the tax 6 Domestic and foreign plants maximize their pro…t with respect to quantities.
For simplicity we assume that the …rms produce homogenous goods, but this has no qualitative implications for our results. The inverse demand functions faced by the …rms are given by
The …rst order conditions can be readily found from @¼ ii =@x ii = 0 and @¼ ij =@x ij = 0 as x ii = p i , and
which allows us to express equilibrium quantities at the third stage as
Using (3) we derive the partial e¤ects for an enterprise of increasing its transfer price. It is straightforward to verify that a change in the transfer price of a …rm k does not a¤ect demand in the domestic market, that is, @x ii =@g i = @x jj =@g j = 0.
However, an increase in the transfer price a¤ects the demand in the foreign country as follows:
From (4) we see that a marginal increase in the transfer price decreases the importing a¢liate's sales by 2=3 units, and increases the local competitor's sales by 1=3 unit:
Hence, the response to an increase in the transfer price by the local competitor is to expand sales and win a greater share of the market.
Turning to stages 2 and 1, we consider the outcomes under Separate Accounting (SA) and Formula Apportionment (FA) separately. We start by investigating the transfer pricing behavior of MNCs.
authorities (see, e.g. Kant, 1988) or as costs that need to be incurred in order to conceal the true price of the product for example by hiring of lawyers and accountants (see, e.g., Hau ‡er and Schjelderup, 2000).
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3 Optimal transfer prices and economic integration (second stage)
At stage 2 the central authority within the multinational …rm determines how the transfer price should optimally be set, taking the tax rates as given.
Separate Accounting (SA) Under the SA method of taxation each country imposes a tax on the pro…ts generated within its borders. The aim of the tax code is therefore to identify the precise receipts and expenditures attributable to the corporation's activities in each jurisdiction. Although repatriated pro…ts in principle are taxed in the country of residence, there is general agreement that due to deferral possibilities and limited tax credit rules, the source principle of taxation is e¤ectively in operation (Keen, 1993, and Tanzi and Bovenberg, 1990) . Taking this into account, global after tax pro…ts of a multinational …rm with headquarters in country i are
The global after tax pro…ts of a multinational are equal to
The problem of the headquarters is to maximize (6) subject to (2) and (3), and this yields the …rst order condition
where we have used (2) to rewrite the …rst order condition in terms of x ij :
Formula Apportionment (FA) Under the FA scheme the tax liability is apportioned to each country based on the activities of the MNC in each country relative to the MNC's world-wide activities. 10 The activity measure used in this model is 10 The FA system is currently used in the US, Canada, and Switzerland. 8 sales in each country, and after tax pro…ts of the MNC with headquarters in country i are
At the second stage the MNC with headquarters in country i has the following maximization problem
where (1), and the quantities are given by equation (3).
It is now useful to de…ne
The variable Á i measures by how much the foreign a¢liate's share of total sales,
, increases if the transfer price g i is reduced by one unit. 11 From equation (4) we know that a marginal reduction in the transfer price leads to a rise in foreign sales by 2=3 units : The resulting increase in the foreign a¢liate's share of total sales is thus higher the smaller the initial value of x ij . Since the export quantity x ij is decreasing in ¿ it follows that
Inserting @x ij = (¡@g i ) by use of (4) in (10) we have that
Under FA, the tax payment of the multinational …rm abroad depends on its foreign sales in proportion to world-wide sales. Á i is an indirect measure of how the share of foreign sales, and thus foreign tax payments, is in ‡uenced by a change in the transfer price. If Á i is large, a marginal change in the transfer price has a signi…cant e¤ect on the apportionment on pro…ts between the two countries. Hence, the larger is Á i ; the more e¤ective will the transfer price be as a pro…t shifting device. In order to derive the optimal transfer price we maximize (9) with respect to g i , and by inserting for (12) we …nd that
in optimum.
Strategic transfer pricing under SA and FA The optimal transfer prices under SA and FA can be derived from (7) with (13). To investigate the strategic trade motive of transfer pricing we set t i = t j´t : Using this assumption in (7) and (13) we establish that the optimal transfer price reduces to
under both SA and FA.
12 Equation (14) shows that when strategic considerations are the only determinant of the transfer price, it should be set below marginal costs.
The reason is that a low transfer price turns the foreign a¢liate into a low cost …rm that behaves aggressively by increasing its sales in the foreign market. The response of the competing local …rm is to scale down its sales thus allowing the foreign a¢liate to capture a larger share of the market.
Using (3) and (14) it is now possible to investigate how economic integration a¤ects foreign sales (x ij )and the transfer price (g i ):
and
12 Solving equation (7) we can express the general expression for the optimal transfer price under SA as
Note that it is not possible to compute g i explicity under FA.
Equation (16) shows that economic integration lowers the transfer price. The intuition is straightforward. A reduction in trade costs enhances the pro…t margin from foreign sales (p i ¡ g i ¡ ¿ ) and thus increases the volume and pro…tability of foreign sales. Hence, it becomes more attractive to use the transfer price as a strategic device to win foreign market shares. Economic integration thus increases pro…ts from sales abroad and makes it more attractive to underinvoice, thereby enhancing the competitiveness of the foreign a¢liate.
Our …ndings in this section are summarized in:
In the absence of pro…t shifting incentives (t i = t j ), economic integration lowers the transfer price under SA and FA.
It is obviously of interest to investigate how the transfer price reacts to di¤erences in national tax rates. This issue is examined in the next section.
Optimal tax rates and economic integration (…rst stage)
At the …rst stage each government sets the tax rate in order to maximize national welfare, taking the taxes of the other country as given. For simplicity, we assume that the multinational …rms are owned by third country residents so welfare equals the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and tax income (T R). We emphasize that excluding producer surplus from the welfare function does not a¤ect the main conclusions of the analysis that follows, but that it simpli…es the analysis signi…cantly. 13 We start by analyzing tax policy under SA.
Separate Accounting (SA) Under SA consumer surplus (CS) and tax income (T R) are given by:
13 An early version of this paper showing this is available from the authors upon request.
The problem of the government is thus to maximize
subject to (7).
The qualitative relationship between equilibrium tax rates and trade costs depends on the tax elasticity of the transfer price. Other things being equal, a low tax elasticity means that taxes can be set high and vice versa. In order to derive how the transfer price set by the MNC with headquarters in country i is a¤ected by changes in tax rates, we use equations (7) and (4) (derivation is given in the Appendix a fortiori assuming identical taxes at the outset):
Notice …rst that a marginal deviation in the tax rate of country i from the symmetric Nash equilibrium rate makes it less attractive to accumulate pro…ts in country i. Equation (20) states that the response of the headquarters in country i to an increase in t i (t j ) is to reduce (increase) the transfer price, thereby saving tax payments by shifting pro…ts to country j (i).
Using (16) in (20) we obtain the following result:
Under Separate Accounting, other things being equal, transfer prices are more tax sensitive the lower the level of trade costs.
The numerator in (20) equals the pro…t margin of the foreign a¢liate, which we have shown to be greater the lower are trade costs. An increase in t j means that the MNC wants to shift pro…ts to country i by increasing the transfer price. The increase in the transfer price is larger, the greater is the pro…t margin (i.e., the lower is ¿ ), since this implies that the MNC needs to shift more pro…ts per unit back to country i. Conversely, if t i increases, the MNC will want to shift sales to the foreign a¢liate by underinvoicing. A large pro…t margin abroad (low trade costs) provides a stronger incentive to underinvoice than if pro…ts from foreign sales are low. To conclude, economic integration increases the pro…t shifting activities of MNCs and the tax sensitivity of national tax bases.
Formula Apportionment (FA) As under SA, the welfare level in country i is
where consumer surplus is still given by (17) , and tax revenue equals
The government in each country thus maximizes (21) subject to (13) . In order to examine the solution to this maximization problem, we shall again use the method of examining how sensitive the transfer prices are to changes in the tax rates. Differentiating equation (13) a fortiori assuming identical taxes at the outset, we …nd that
We see from (23) and (24) that the signs of @g i =@t i and @g i =@t j are the same as under SA: a higher tax rate in one country encourages …rms to use the transfer price as a device to shift pro…ts to the other country. However, from (11) we note that Á is an increasing function of ¿ : Using this result in equations (23) and (24) (10) and (12) it is seen that a change in the transfer price has a signi…cant impact on Á i if the foreign a¢liate's share of total sales -due to high trade costs -is small initially. In this case a given change in g i (and thus in x ij ) has a large e¤ect on the (relative) share of sales abroad, since the increase in foreign sales starts from a very low level, because of the high trade costs. On the other hand, for low levels of trade costs, the foreign a¢liate's share of total sales is quite large, and the relative share of sales will therefore not change very much in response to a change in the transfer price. Thus, the tax gain from changing the transfer price is small, implying that g i is relatively insensitive to changes in either of the tax rates.
Numerical simulations It is not possible to derive an explicit analytical solution to the welfare maximization problem under FA. We must therefore rely on numerical simulations to compare the two tax principles and how economic integration a¤ects the equilibrium tax rates. Figure 1 shows that equilibrium tax rates under SA are lower, the lower the level of trade costs. The reason is that as economic integration proceeds, transfer prices under SA become more tax sensitive. This means that the tax base becomes more sensitive to changes in national tax rates. Each country, therefore, has an incentive to lower its tax rate in order to attract taxable pro…ts. Since neither country takes into account the …scal externality from a marginal change in its own tax rate, this leads to a "race to the bottom" (i.e., tax rates will be too low in the tax equilibrium compared to the outcome under coordination). This result is similar to the outcome in standard tax competition models.
14 By examining Figure 1 it is seen that there is an inverse relationship between trade costs and equilibrium taxes under FA. The intuition can be found by examining (11) and (23) . Since Á is an increasing function of ¿ (see eq. (11)), economic 14 See e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowksi (1986) is thus more expensive to the corporation the lower the level of trade costs. Economic integration thereby makes the …rms less tax elastic, making it optimal for each country to increase its tax rate.
To conclude, Figure 1 shows that the e¤ect of increased economic integration on equilibrium taxes and tax revenue depends crucially on the tax regime in force. While under SA increased economic integration leads to lower tax revenue, the opposite is true under FA. This suggests that at the intersection between the two curves in Figure 1 , one tax principle may be preferred to the other. However, to make a full welfare assessment it should be noted that economic integration under any tax regime a¤ects consumer surplus positively due to enhanced competition leading to lower prices and larger quantities sold. Thus, under SA we have two opposing e¤ects of increased integration; on the one hand, rising consumer surplus, on the other hand, falling tax rates, and as a consequence, lower tax revenue. In contrast, with FA, both consumer surplus and tax rates rise, implying higher tax revenues. Figure   2 conveys the discussion above by indicating that an SA regime provides the highest welfare level for a low degree of integration (high trade costs), while an FA regime becomes more attractive as integration proceeds. Simply put, with high trade costs the e¤ect of tax competition is weak under SA, but strong under FA in the sense that incentives to shift pro…ts are small under SA but large under FA. Hence, for a high degree of economic integration, the FA regime may come to dominate the SA regime from a welfare perspective. 
Concluding remarks
The analysis has demonstrated that the transfer price is relatively tax elastic for a high degree of economic integration under SA, while the opposite is true under formula apportionment. As a consequence, the impact of economic integration on welfare and on the intensity of tax competition depends crucially on the choice of tax scheme. Economic integration under SA intensi…es tax competition while reducing the competitive forces under FA. These relationships are mirrored in the relationship between economic integration and welfare under the two di¤erent tax regimes. In terms of national welfare, the SA system may dominate for low degrees of integration, while the FA system takes prominence as an integration process proceeds. Hence, our 16 results support the view brought forward by many other economists 15 that increased economic integration may call for a substantial reform of the corporate tax system. 15 See, e.g. Musgrave (1973) , Bird and Brennan (1986) , McLure (1989) , Bucks and Mazerov (1993) and Shakelford and Slemrod (1998) .
